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Abstract 
In this paper, the integrated signal-to-artificial noise (ISAN) design is applied in MIMO wiretap 
channel to ensure wireless communication security. When the information of eavesdropper is unknown, 
the total power is divided into two parts: signal and artificial noise. The signal can secure certain quality at 
the legitimate receiver. The artificial noise which is in the null space of the receiver channel matrix can 
deteriorate eavesdropper channel by the method of beam forming. The artificial noise power is distributed 
evenly in other space, so that the eavesdropper channel is deteriorated in all directions. The signal to 
interface and noise ratio (SINR) is regarded as the efficient parameter on measuring reliability and security 
of information at the legitimate receiver. The simulations reveal that ISAN can deteriorate the 
eavesdropper channel and safeguard the information transmission on the premise of the given SINR of the 
legitimate receiver. 
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1. Introduction 
With the rapid development of wireless communication business, the security of 
information transmission has been paid widely attention. The traditional encryption methods are 
mostly based on cryptography [1]-[3], which built security mechanism above the network layer. 
In 1975, Wyner proposed the wiretap channel model (WTC), which provided the theoretic 
foundation for information transmission over physical layer from the angle of information theory. 
The WTC proved that there is a security capacity sC ( 0sC  ) when the channels of 
eavesdropper is inferior to the source. The information can be transmitted safely from the 
source to the destination if the data rate is less than sC , in this situation the eavesdropper can 
receive the data, but he cannot obtain any useful information of source [4]. In this paper, the 
source is Alice, the legitimate receiver is Bob, and the eavesdropper is Eve. Eve can get part of 
the source information by wiretapping. The channel between Alice and Bob is main channel, 
and the channel between Alice and Eve is eavesdropper channel (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The wiretap channel 
 
TELKOMNIKA  ISSN: 1693-6930  
 
Integration of Signal and Artificial Noise in MIMO Wiretap Channel (Zhiliang Yang) 
479
The aim of integrated signal-to-artificial noise (ISAN) design is to improve sC . There 
were many researches on the methods by which sC  can be improved. The security capacity of 
WTC is proposed based on the broadcasting channel. The main channel of the wiretap channel 
is noiseless channel, and the eavesdropper channel is recession channel of the main channel 
(Binary Symmetric Channel). S. Leung calculated under these conditions that main channel and 
eavesdropper channel are Gaussian channels [5], and proved that when the eavesdropper 
channel is the degraded channel of main channel, sC  is the difference between the main 
channel and the eavesdropper channel. To increase sC significantly, Hero introduced the 
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) and space diversity technology into security 
communication [6], and gave the fundamental computing method of sC . A. Khisti [7]-[9] studied 
the computing method of sC  in the MIMOME scenarios. In most cases, because the 
eavesdropper is passive, Alice cannot obtain anything about the channel state information (CSI) 
of Eve, Negi [10]-[13] proposed the scheme of artificial noise to maximum the security rate when 
the eavesdropper is passive. The basic idea of the scheme is: Alice splits the transmitting signal 
vector into two parts: the signal vector and the artificial noise vector. The artificial noise lies in 
the null space of the signal vector, deteriorates the eavesdropper channel and has no effect on 
the main channel. N. Romero studied the scheme of artificial noise to secure data transmission 
in the MISO system [14]-[15]. The receiver signal to interface and noise ratio (SINR) is applied 
as the measurement of sC  by A. Mukherjee, then he proposed an optimized method of power 
distribution [16]. 
Based on former researches, ISAN design is proposed in the MIMO wiretap channel 
which can deteriorate the eavesdropper channel and safeguard the information transmission 
over the wireless channel, meanwhile, security rate is always positive and Bob can get the 
information successfully. 
 
 
2. MIMOME system model 
The number of transmitter antennas of Alice is ( 2)a aN N  , the number of receiver 
antennas of Bob is ( 1)b bN N  , the number of eavesdropper antennas of Eve is ( 1)e eN N   (see 
Figure 2). We suppose that the channel between Alice and Bob is Rayleigh flat fading 
channel( bH ) which is known by Alice and its covariance matrix is
2
bh
 I ; the channel between 
Alice and Eve is Rayleigh flat fading channel( eH ) which is unknown by Alice its covariance 
matrix is 2
eh
 I . The channel between Alice and Bob and noise vector ( bn ) are superimposed; 
the channel between Alice and Eve and noise vector ( en ) are superimposed. We suppose that 
the values of bn at different times are independent of each other, the mean of bn is zero, and the 
variance of bn (
2
b )is complex Gaussian matrix. Vector en  also has such a property. 
Respectively the variance matrix of bn and en is: 
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We suppose that the signals of Alice based on beam forming technology is s , the signal 
received by Bob and Eve is as following: 
 
e
b b b
e e




y
y
H s n
H s n
 (2) 
 
The covariance matrix of s  is { }Hs EQ ss , the total power of s  is 0 { }P Tr sQ 。  
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Figure 2. The MIMOME wiretap channel 
 
 
3. Integrated signal-to-artificial noise design 
3.1. The model of ISAN 
The signal s  can be split into two parts: signal vector and artificial noise vector. The 
total power of s  is defined: 0P a b  , where a  is the power that Alice wants to send and b  is 
the artificial noise power. Then the signal s  can be defined as  
 
a d b s t η                                 (3) 
 
Where t  is the ( 1)aN   normalized beam forming vector and 1t‖‖ . d  is the scalar 
complex information symbol which Alice wants to send, and the mean of d  is {| |} 1E d  . η  is 
the ( 1)aN  artificial noise vector, its covariance matrix is { }HE Q ηη , and its trace is 
{ }Tr Q ( { } 1Tr  Q ). 
The signals that Bob and Eve receive are 
 
b b b
e e e e
b d
a
ba
bd
 
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H t H η n
H t H η n       (4) 
 
Because Eve is a passive receiver, Alice cannot get the CSI about Eve. In this case, we 
should not regard sC  as the security measurement of the system. The receiver signal to 
interference and noise ratio (SINR) reflects the receiver quality, so the SINR is used to indicate 
the quality of receiver signals.  
Assume bw  denotes the 1bN   beam forming vector of Bob. Similarly, ew  denotes the 
1eN  beam forming vector of Eve, the receiver vector of Bob and Eve can be denoted 
separately as: 
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And the receiver SINR of Bob and Eve can be denoted separately as: 
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If b eSINR SINR , there is the scheme of modulation and coding to ensure that Bob can 
decode the message d  successfully, at the same time, Eve cannot get anything about d . 
The MIMO wiretap channel based on integrated signal-to-artificial noise design can be 
described as: 
 
0
min
. .
0 0,
b
e
b
SINR
s t P a b
SINR
a b

 

 
t
 (7) 
 
Where b  is the given target value of Bob’s SINR. 
 
 
3.2. Integrated signal-to-artificial noise design 
The aim of integrated signal-to-artificial noise design is to cause Alice to send the noise 
in all directions, to influence the eavesdropper as much as possible, and to influence the 
legitimate receiver as little as possible. 
Alice’s beam forming vector is t  which is the eigenvectors corresponding to the 
maximum eigenvalue of bH . Artificial noise vector ( η) is the linear combination of other 
1aN  characteristic vectors of bH . As a result, the signal vectors and artificial noise vectors are 
orthogonal. Other 1aN  characteristic vectors of bH  are distributed equally, in this principle, η  
is defined as: 
 
2
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aN
i
a
i
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Where, it is the ith eigenvector of bH , and i  is a random complex scalar which has 
unit amplitude and random phase. i  is defined as： iji e   .
          
 
The phase of i is i  which follows uniform distribution, and [0,2 ]i  . Q  is defined 
as: 
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bw is Bob’s receive beam forming vector( b bw H t ). Eve’s SINR will be maximized 
when his beam forming vector is 2 1( + )He e e e e  w H Q H I H t . 
At this moment, the SINRs of Bob and Eve are bSINR  and eSINR respectively. 
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where, 1  is the maximum eigenvalue of bH .  
                   ISSN: 1693-6930 
 
 
TELKOMNIKA  Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2015 :  478 – 486 
482
The information of eavesdropper cannot be sure, and we cannot ensure that the 
eavesdropper is influenced by manual noise, so we can deteriorate eavesdropper channel as 
far as possible statistically. SINR can describe the extent how the eavesdropper channel is 
influenced by manual noise. Under the conditions that the total transmit power and Bob’s SINR 
are constant, all these problems come down to find Eve’s minimum SINR with bSINR  
constraints:  
 
2 1
1 1
0
2
1
2
min min [ )( ]
. .
0, 0
H H H
e e e e e e
b b
b
AV E a
s t a b
SINR
a
P
b
a
 
 
 


 


t H H Q H I H t
 (11) 
 
 
4. Results and Analysis 
Because the eavesdropper  channel is unknown, the Monte Carlo method is applied to 
examine how the integrated signal-to-artificial noise design affects the eavesdropper  channel. 
All the simulations in the paper set the times of Monte Carlo experiment to be 5000, and the 
signal-to-interference-and-noise-ratio (SINR) of the legitimate receiver (Bob) is 5b dB  . Once 
Alice know Eve’s average SINR in CSI, and the situation of Bob’s SINR is proper, Alice could 
put artificial noise in Eve’s channel space easily in order to deteriorate the eavesdropper 
channel. 
The method applied when Alice knows the exact Eve’s location is used for 
reference.The ISAN and Ref are applied separately when the number of the antennas is 
8, 4, 4ba eN N N   . The Figure 3 shows the average SINR of eavesdropper in all situations. 
The results reveal that the SINR of legitimate receiver must be proper, in this situation, Eve’s 
SINR gets smaller and allocated power of artificial noise becomes higher with the gradually 
increasing transmit power, and the security performance is better. If Alice knows that the Eve’s 
CSI, more targeted actions have been taken by Alice to interfere with Eve. The result shows that 
Eve’s SINR would be kept below 13dB  if the transmit power of Alice is big enough. The above 
method is supposed as a Ref. For ISAN, the artificial noise is distributed evenly from every 
direction, and the simulation results reveal that such a method can deteriorate eavesdropper  
channel effectively though its SINR is worse than the Ref. For example, if the transmit 
power 0 15P dB , reception SINR would below 13dB (which is approximates to zero). 
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Figure 3. The average eSINR  with respect to different transmit power 
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4.1. How does the number of antenna influences SINR of eavesdropper 
The numbers of transmitting antennas and receiving antennas will affect the SINR of 
the receiver. The performance of eavesdropper‘s SINR is analyzed when the numbers of 
transmitting antennas and receiving antennas change on the premise that the SINR of 
legitimate receiver is constant( 5b dB  ).In the method of ISAN, the performance of Eve’s 
average SINR corresponding to the number of the antennas ( 4, 4b eN N  ) is different (see 
Figure 4). The simulations reveal that the increase of the numbers of transmitting antennas and 
transmit power will reduce eSINR  dramatically, especially a eN N .For  example, eSINR will 
reach the level of 1310 dB when 08, 10aN P dB  . It is found that the gain of legitimate receiver 
channel and the dimension of artificial noise vector will increase when the number of 
transmitting antennas increases. As a result, the eavesdropper will be interfered seriously. 
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Figure 4. The average eSINR  with respect to different transmitting antennas of Alice 
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Figure 5. The average eSINR  with respect to different RX antennas of Bob 
 
 
In the method of ISAN, Eve’s eSINR varies according to the changing bN  when 
aN and eN are constant ( 4, 4a eN N  ) (see Figure5). The simulations reveal that the increasing 
of bN  will decrease eSINR . As a result, the interference is greater within this context . It can not 
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be ignored that eSINR is affected by aN as well as bN ,and the changing bN has less influence 
than changing aN because the increasing bN only raise the diversity gain of legitimate receiver. 
 
 
4.2. How does the channel variance influences SINR of eavesdropper 
In the MIMO Wiretap channel, the important conclusion of information transmission 
security is the quality of legitimate receiver channel is superior to eavesdropper channel. The 
significant advantage of ISAN is that the information can be transferred security even if the 
quality of legitimate receiver channel is inferior to eavesdropper channel. In the section, we 
analyze the impacts of the quality of legitimate receiver channel and eavesdropper channel on 
the eSINR of eavesdropper (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. The average eSINR ; a) with respect to different 0P  and 
2 2/
e bh h
   holistically; b) with 
respect to different 0P  and 
2 2/
e bh h
   
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In MIMOME, if the number of antennas are fixed ( 8, 4, 4a b eN N N   ), Eve’s average 
eSINR changes with the ratio of eavesdropper channel variance and the receivers channel 
variance ( 2 2/
e bh h
  ). Fig 6a shows how the eSINR changes with the change of 2 2/e bh h  and 0P  
holistically. Fig 6b shows how the eSINR changes with the change of
2 2/
e bh h
  and 0P respectively. 
The simulations reveal that ISAN can solve the influence caused by the difference between 
legitimate receiver channel and eavesdropper channel efficiently. For example, when 0 10P dB , 
2 2/ 2
beh h
dB   ,the varience of eavesdropper channel is 100 times the varience of legitimate 
receiver channel, and the method of ISAN can reduce eSINR  to the level of 
910 dB . The higher 
the transmit power is, the more effective the ISAN deal with the difference between legitimate 
receiver channel and eavesdropper channel. The simulations reveal that when the 
eavesdropper channel is superior to the receiver channel, ISAN can ensure the quality of Bob’s 
receiver bSINR  and reduce Eve’s average eSINR . As a result, the channel capacity of 
eavesdropper will be reduced markedly and information's security can be ensured effectively. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, the method of integrated signal-to-artificial noise is applied in MIMO to 
improve the security of signals transmission. We design the specific steps to implement the 
algorithm. The method in which the transmitter knows the information of eavesdropper is used 
as a reference method, and we compare the interruptions of eavesdropper from different 
methods. The influences with eavesdropper are analyzed from the perspectives of the number 
of the antennas and channel variance. The simulations reveal that ISAN can reduce the 
average SINR of eavesdropper effectively and the security of information transmission will be 
improved on the condition of fixed SINR at the legitimate receiver.  
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